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Abstract: This study adopts Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems (SES) 
framework in empirical fieldwork to explain how local forestry institutions 
affect forest ecosystems and social equity in the community of Mawlyngbna 
in North-East India. Data was collected through 26 semi-structured interviews, 
participatory timeline development, policy documents, direct observation, 
periodicals, transect walks, and a concurrent forest-ecological study in the village. 
Results show that Mawlyngbna’s forests provide important sources of livelihood 
benefits for the villagers. However, ecological disturbance and diversity vary 
among the different forest property types and forest-based livelihood benefits 
are inequitably distributed. Based on a behavioural rational choice approach, our 
analysis proposes a set of causal mechanisms that trace these observed social-
ecological outcomes to the attributes of the resource system, resource units, actors 
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and governance system. We analyse opportunities and constraints of interactions 
between the village, regional, and state levels. We discuss how Ostrom’s design 
principles for community-based resource governance inform the explanation of 
robustness but have a blind spot in explaining social equity. We report experiences 
made using the SES framework in empirical fieldwork. We conclude that mapping 
cross-level interactions in the SES framework needs conceptual refinement and 
that explaining social equity of forest governance needs theoretical advances.
Keywords: Cross-level interactions, equity, forestry, institutional analysis, North-
East India, robustness, social-ecological systems
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1. Introduction
It is now widely acknowledged that there is no simple blueprint for sustainable 
governance of natural resources (Ostrom 2007). Problems of resource governance 
differ with the attributes of the affected resource systems, resource units, 
governance systems and actors (Ostrom 2009). They differ with the kind of 
encountered cross-level interactions (Cash et al. 2006) and with the normative 
criteria used for assessing the sustainability of social-ecological systems (e.g. 
robustness and longevity; equity and fairness; efficiency; biodiversity; food 
security). Rather than adopting blueprints, sustainable governance of natural 
resources therefore requires that governance arrangements are matched with the 
respective social-ecological setting and with the specific problems the involved 
actors face (Ostrom 2007).
A diagnostic approach has been suggested to integrate sustainability research 
from diverse contexts and to learn in a cumulative manner how governance 
arrangements affect incentives, social interactions, and outcomes of resource 
governance in specific social-ecological conditions (Young 2002; Ostrom 2007). 
The Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework was suggested as an important 
step in this direction (Ostrom 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). Its detailed 
conceptual map compiles (i) attributes of resource systems, resource units, actors, 
and governance systems that were found to shape the sustainability of natural 
resource governance; (ii) contextual factors in which a social-ecological system is 
embedded (e.g. globalization pressures, technological change); and (iii) variables 
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that capture the multiple facets of social interaction and outcomes. This catalogue 
of variables is an answer to the question: Which factors account for diverging 
trajectories and outcomes of resource governance?
At this stage, one of the important next steps is to use the SES framework for the 
purpose of theory development. The catalogue of variables alone does not enable 
analysts to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ success or failure has occurred. Furthermore, 
it does not enable analysts to predict likely consequences of governance proposals. 
For these purposes, we need to understand how configurations of SES variables 
shape the incentives and interactions among actors as well as social-ecological 
outcomes (Ostrom 2007; Cox et al. 2010; Frey and Rusch 2013). As Agrawal 
and Benson (2011) argue, this endeavour should pay particular attention to the 
multiple and potentially conflicting dimensions of social-ecological outcomes 
including sustainability, robustness, livelihoods, efficiency, and equity. Moreover, 
given that polycentric governance approaches are increasingly considered (e.g. 
Pahl-Wostl 2009; Ostrom 2010; Biggs et al. 2012), an analytical perspective is 
required that is sensitive to questions of spatial, jurisdictional, and temporal scales 
as well as cross-level interactions in resource governance.
This study intends to contribute to this research agenda in four ways. (1) It 
adopts the SES framework to conduct a case study of community forestry in the 
village of Mawlyngbna in North-East India. We report experiences made by using 
the SES framework as an analytical tool in empirical field research and suggest 
modifications. (2) We propose empirically validated mechanisms to explain how 
combinations of resource, governance, and actor variables shape ecological status 
and social inequity in private and community forests in Mawlyngbna. (3) We 
analyse cross-level interactions between various governance levels and suggest 
to slightly modify the SES framework for this task. (4) We discuss the relevance 
of Ostrom’s (1990, 2010) design principles of robust SES for explaining social 
inequities of forest governance.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the study area and 
Section 3 outlines the methods and the analytical approach. Section 4 presents 
the social-ecological system in Mawlyngbna, explains the observed ecological 
status and social equity outcomes and analyses cross-level interactions in 
Meghalaya’s community-based forest governance system. Section 5 discusses 
the varying diagnostic power of Ostrom’s (1990, 2010) design principles to 
explain the robustness and equity dimensions of sustainable forest governance 
in Mawlyngbna. Moreover, it discusses the essential role of trust and identities 
for polycentric governance and reports experiences with the SES framework in 
empirical fieldwork. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2. Context of the study area
The case study village Mawlyngbna is located in the East Khasi Hills district of 
Meghalaya on the edge of the Shillong plateau facing the plains of Bangladesh 
about 75 km south of the state’s capital Shillong (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Location of the case study village Mawlyngbna. 
Source: LaHaela 2013.
Case study village
The village of Mawlyngbna consists of 360 households (GIZ 2012). Its inhabitants 
all belong to the Khasi tribe with no fractions based on class, caste or tribes 
(Gurdon 1914). It received public attention through government investments 
in infrastructure (e.g. a multi-purpose reservoir), through its natural features 
(e.g. natural springs, urchin (Echinoidea) fossils), and through the development 
engagement of the German Development Organisation (GIZ) in the village (e.g. 
Times of India 30th January 2011; Northeast Today 4th March 2012; Shillong 
Times 12th November 2012).
Forest resources
Meghalaya is part of the Indo-Burma biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al. 2000). The 
variety in topographic, climatic, and edaphic conditions results in a vast diversity 
of vegetation in tropical evergreen/semi-evergreen forests (GoM 2005; Tiwari 
and Kumar 2008). However, in the period 2006 through 2009, the East Khasi 
Hills district lost 15.5% of its forest cover. The losses are ascribed to factors such 
as land conversion and short cycle shifting cultivation, rapid population growth, 
and mining activities (GoI 2011a).
Population and ethnicity
The population growth rate of the East Khasi Hills district of about 25% between 
2001 and 2011 was one of the highest in India (GoI 2011b). The majority (89%) 
of Meghalaya’s population belongs to one of three tribes, who predominantly 
inhabit three different regions of the state: Khasi in Khasi Hills, Garo in Garo 
Hills and Jaintia in Jaintia Hills (GoI 2001). The Khasi society has a tradition 
of governance through customary institutional arrangements with a strong bond 
between the family, the clan and the village council. They consider themselves 
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as descendent of single lineage. Meghalaya is one of the few Indian states where 
Christianity constitutes the predominant religion.
Matrilineality
Matrilineality is practiced by the three predominant tribes in Meghalaya, in which 
descent is traced through the mother and maternal ancestors (Karlsson 2006). The 
forms of matrilineality vary both among and within the tribes. The Khasi form 
generally privileges the youngest daughter by making her the custodian of the 
largest share of the ancestral property, jewellery, and family house. However, as 
such she is not a full owner since she does not have the right to alienate any of the 
inherited belongings. Along with the property come certain obligations such as the 
duty to care for the aging parents or to uphold the family rituals and traditions. An 
exception constitutes property acquired by the parents themselves. In this case the 
distribution and share among the children is on the parents to decide. Once inherited 
by the children, it counts for ancestral property (Nongbri 2000; Subba 2008).
Political system
The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution grants a high degree of self-governing 
autonomy to tribal communities in Meghalaya. It formally acknowledges the full 
jurisdiction of tribal communities over land, forests (except reserved forests and 
protected areas), and natural resources (Dasgupta and Symlieh 2006; Karlsson 
2006). The political system is structured into three tiers: the Legislative Assembly, 
the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs), and the local traditional institutions. 
The central law-making body in Meghalaya is the Legislative Assembly 
whereas the ADCs formally control the traditional institutions by appointing and 
suspending local chiefs and by passing regulations such as acts concerning forest 
management (Nongkynrih 2006).
There is remarkable diversity in traditional institutions of the Khasi tribal 
people. The Khasi territory is divided into states (“Himas”), which are associations 
of villages constituted as limited monarchies. The traditional head of a Hima is 
the king (“Syiem”), who is appointed by the Syiem family of the state. The Syiem 
controls the local village markets and the resource management of community land 
such as forests. He is responsible for conflict resolution and for the institutional 
arrangements applying on the Hima level. However, any decisions of importance 
require the endorsement of the executive council of ministers (“Myntries”) 
(Baruah 2004; Tiwari et al. 2010, 2013).
In the Hima Mawsynram, in which the study village is located, the Syiem 
is elected by the heads of four principal clans or in a people’s vote in case of an 
impasse (Gurdon 1914). On the village level, a headman (“Rangbah Shnong”) 
is elected by the village councils (“Dorbar Shnong”). Although endowed with 
particular importance through matrilineality, women are traditionally excluded 
from the local Khasi collective-choice institutions such as the village councils 
(Gurdon 1914; Subba 2008).
Institutions for sustainable forest governance 675
3. Methods and analytical approach
3.1. The social-ecological systems (SES) framework
We use the SES framework (Ostrom 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014) to 
analyse the ecological status, social equity, and cross-level interactions of forest 
governance in Mawlyngbna, India. The framework conceives social-ecological 
systems as consisting of four main subsystems, i.e. the resource system, the 
resource units, the governance system and actors (Figure 2). McGinnis and 
Ostrom (2014) acknowledge that a SES can comprise multiple, concurrent sets of 
each subsystem. For example, several conceptually distinct governance systems 
may regulate one or more resource systems that are used by several actor groups. 
The broader social, economic, and political setting as well as related ecosystems 
define the wider context of a SES. The attributes of the context, resource systems, 
resource units, actors, and governance systems enable, constrain, and shape 
activities, processes (interactions), and outcomes in action situations (Ostrom 
2011). Detailed information about these eight broad categories of SES context, 
structure, interactions, and outcomes is provided by second-tier variables that are 
subcomponents of the first-tier variables.
We utilised the SES framework in a mixed deductive-inductive approach for 
this study. As a deductive starting point, the second-tier variables as proposed by 
McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) structured our coding scheme for data analysis. In 
several inductive steps, the SES framework was adapted during data analysis in 
Social, economic and political settings (S)
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Figure 2: Revised social-ecological systems framework with multiple first-tier components. 
Source: McGinnis and Ostrom 2014.
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order to capture relevant phenomena in this case study. Two main modifications 
were warranted. They concern how interactions between governance levels in 
polycentric systems and social equity are conceptualised in the SES framework. 
These modifications are discussed in detail in Section 5.3. Table 1 shows the 
adapted second-tier variables that result from our analysis of ecological outcomes, 
social equity, and cross-level interactions in forest governance in Mawlyngbna.
To conceptualise property rights (variable GS3) we adopt the terminology of 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992, 250): “A property right is the authority to undertake 
particular actions related to a specific domain.” Property rights are the products 
of operational, collective choice, and constitutional rules. Based on Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992), we distinguish five components of property rights (cf. McGinnis 
2011): (i) access (right to enter specified parts of a resource system), (ii) withdrawal 
(right to obtain specified resource units), (iii) management (right to participate 
in decisions to regulate access and withdrawal and to make improvements in 
the resource system), (iv) exclusion (right to determine who will have access, 
withdrawal, and management rights), and (v) alienation (right to sell or lease one 
or more of the above rights). In addition, (vi) inheritance is important here, i.e. 
the passing on of one or more of the above rights from an older to a younger 
generation.
3.2. Explaining interactions and outcomes
This study explains how ecological outcomes and social (in)equity in forest 
governance are shaped by the attributes of the resource systems, resource units, 
governance systems, and actors in Mawlyngbna. Drawing these inferences requires 
sound theoretical guidance. We adopt the behavioural rational choice approach 
from Ostrom (2005) and Gibson et al. (2005) to draw inferences between the 
variables of the SES framework. This approach provides an analytical heuristics 
to infer from SES attributes to outcomes by analysing how SES variables affect 
individual decision-making and how decisions translate into interaction patterns 
and social-ecological outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates this analytical heuristics. It 
proceeds by analysing how the attributes of the resource systems, resource units, 
governance systems, actors, and the wider context of a SES shape the focal action 
situation. The action situation is characterised by the relevant positions, actors, 
their action spaces, information, possible outcomes, the actors’ control over 
outcomes, and costs and benefits associated with outcomes (Ostrom 2005, 2011). 
The analysis continues to trace how these attributes of the action situation define 
the incentives that the relevant actors face for particular actions. Incentives consist 
of both the external stimuli and the internal reasons that actors have to choose 
particular actions in light of their information processing capacities, values, 
preferences, and decision heuristics (Gibson et al. 2005; Ostrom 2005). Through 
shaping the various choices of actors over time, the main incentives translate into 
patterns of social interactions (e.g. harvesting levels, monitoring, deliberation, rule 
changes) which in turn affect the ecological and social performance in the SES 
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Table 1: Coding scheme: second-tier variables of the SES framework (adapted from McGinnis 
and Ostrom 2014; underlined: added variables during iterative coding, cf. Section 5.3).
Social, economic, and political settings (S)
S1 Economic development, S2 Demographic trends, S3 Political Stability, S4 Other governance systems,
S5 Markets, S6 Media organisations, S7 Technology
Resource Systems (RS) Governance Systems (GS)
RS1 Sector GS1 Organisations
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries GS1.1 National level
RS3 Size of resource system GS1.2 State level
RS4 Human-constructed facilities GS1.3 District level
RS5 Productivity of system GS1.4 Regional level
RS6 Equilibrium properties GS1.5 Village level
RS7 Predictability of system dynamics GS1.6 Boundary organisations
RS8 Storage capacities GS2 Network structure
RS9 Location GS3 Property rights system
RS10 History GS4 Operational-choice rules
 GS4.1 Community reserve forest
 GS4.2 Private forest
GS5 Collective-choice rules
GS6 Constitutional-choice rules
GS7 Monitoring and sanctioning rules
GS8 Conflict resolution rules
Resource Units (RU) Actors (A)
RU1 Resource unit mobility A1 Number of relevant actors
RU2 Growth or replacement rate A2 Socioeconomic attributes
RU3 Interaction among resource units A3 History or past experiences
RU4 Economic value A4 Location
RU5 Number of units A5 Leadership/entrepreneurship
RU6 Distinctive characteristics A6 Norms (trust-reciprocity)/ social capital
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution A7 Knowledge of SES/mental models
A8 Importance of resource (dependence)
A9 Technology available
Action Situations: Interactions (I) à Outcomes (O)
Interactions (I) (Activities and Processes) Outcomes (O)
I1 Same-level interactions I2 Cross-level interactions O1 Social outcomes
 I1.1 Harvesting  I2.1 Financial transactions  O1.1 Equity of livelihood opportunities
 I1.2 Information sharing  I2.2 Information sharing
 I1.3 Deliberation processes  I2.3 Deliberation processes O2 Ecological outcomes
 I1.4 Conflicts  I2.4 Conflicts  O2.1 Level of disturbance
 I1.5 Investment activities  I2.5 Investment activities  O2.2 Biodiversity
 I1.6 Lobbying activities  I2.6 Lobbying activities  O2.3 Trend in forest area
 I1.7 Self-organising activities  I2.7 Rule-making activities O3 Externalities to other SESs
 I1.8 Networking activities  I2.8 Networking activities O4 Outcomes of cross-level interactions 
 I1.9 Monitoring activities  I2.9 Monitoring activities
 I1.10 Evaluative activities  I2.10 Evaluative activities
 I1.11 Rule compliance  I2.11 Rule compliance
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1 Climate patterns, ECO2 Pollution patterns, ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES
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(e.g. biodiversity, livelihoods). We use this heuristics to explain how the observed 
configurations of SES variables affect observed interactions and outcomes of 
forest governance in Mawlyngbna.
3.3. Case study methods
Empirical evidence was gained from 26 in-depth and focused, semi-structured 
interviews that were triangulated with direct observation of community meetings, 
participatory timeline development, periodicals, documents (GoM 2005, 2013; 
GoI 2011a,b; GIZ 2012), and transect walks within a fieldwork period of seven 
weeks from January through March 2013. Information about the biophysical 
features of the SES was gained from a concurrent forest vegetation study that 
was part of a joint research project (LaHaela 2013). Scholarly publications about 
forest governance in other parts of Meghalaya complemented our original data.
Following the field guide of the International Forestry Resources and 
Institutions research program (IFRI 2011) we prepared an interview guideline 
and used snowball sampling to identify appropriate interview partners. Our 
interview partners comprised government officials, village council members, 
school teachers, village elders, members of a Khasi organisation, youth 
organisation, religious organisation, and of NGOs. Based on IFRI’s field guide, 
the interviews were noted in a field notebook, reviewed, and transcribed into a 
digital file. Qualitative Content Analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data. 
We followed a mixed deductive and inductive procedure. The variables of the 
SES framework initially structured our coding scheme by interpreting the data 
as manifestations of the first-tier and relevant sub-tier variables. The set of SES 
variables was modified inductively where needed in order to capture the empirical 
material most appropriately. Our preliminary findings were discussed and verified 
in Mawlyngbna during a second field stay in December 2013.
4. Results
The community of Mawlyngbna has governed the forest patches that surround its 
village for decades. Its members have been able to avoid a severe “tragedy of the 
commons”. The state government and the GIZ have identified Mawlyngbna as a 
model village for implementation of development schemes based on features such 
as better natural resource governance, a well knit society and working institutional 
SES variables:
GS, RS, RU,
A,S, ECO
Focal action
situation
Incentives Patterns ofinteraction Outcomes
Figure 3: Explaining interactions and outcomes in SES.
Source: adapted from Gibson et al. 2005, 26.
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arrangements (GIZ 2012; Shillong Times 12th November 2012). However, forest 
governance is not without problems in Mawlyngbna. Some forest patches show 
comparatively low biodiversity and biomass parameters. Resource access, related 
livelihood options, and wealth are inequitably distributed among the villagers. 
Moreover, impacts of climate change and population growth are perceived to 
increase pressure on the local social-ecological system. To analyse these challenges, 
Section 4.1 describes the SES in Mawlyngbna by using the SES framework. Based 
on this description, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 analyse how the observed ecological 
outcomes and social inequities can be explained by the observed attributes 
of resources, governance system, and actors. Section 4.4 explores cross-level 
interactions between actors at the village, regional, district, and state levels.
4.1. Social-ecological system in Mawlyngbna, Meghalaya, India
Social, economic, and political setting (S-variables)
The context of Mawlyngbna’s social-ecological system is characterised by a 
relatively stable political environment and constitutional rights granting autonomy 
to tribal communities. Population growth reached 25% between 2001 and 2011 
and development parameters, although urban centric, are highest in the East Khasi 
Hills district (GoI 2011b). Recent economic developments such as infrastructure 
constructions entice private and community land users to exploit the region’s 
natural resources for revenue purposes.
Related ecosystems (ECO)
Changing weather conditions over time was the predominant issue of the 
respondents with regard to Mawlyngbna’s climate patterns. Most interviewees 
reported declining amounts of rainfall over the last decades both in the rainy 
season and in the dry period. Decreasing crop yields were reported that coincide 
with the period of decreased rainfall which confirms scholarly findings (e.g. 
Ravindranath et al. 2011). 
Resource systems (RS)
Mawlyngbna is surrounded by open grasslands and sub-tropical evergreen forest 
(Figure 4). Boundaries between different patches of the resource system are 
clear, e.g. by water bodies, footpaths, rocks, and different vegetation types. The 
community reserve forest covers 119 ha, private patches another estimated 100 ha 
(LaHaela 2013). Human-constructed facilities include several paved roads that 
facilitate the extraction of resources, networks of footpaths, and a dammed lake 
for irrigation purposes.
Resource units (RU)
Mawlyngbna’s forests provide resource units such as firewood, timber, medicinal 
plants, black pepper, betel and oranges that are essential to the villagers’ 
livelihoods. Furthermore, on arable land of non-protected forests, income can be 
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generated by cultivating cash crops such as broom grass (Thysanolaena maxima), 
bay leaf (Cinnamomum tamala) and areca nut (Areca catechu). Also, rice and 
vegetables such as potatoes and sweet potatoes are cultivated in clearings. In some 
areas the forest is removed for limestone quarrying. Moreover, the respondents 
identified several forest ecosystem services as vital to their livelihoods including 
water storage and filtration, protection against soil erosion, as well as aesthetic 
and touristic values. No systematic inventories of forest resources are collected 
in Mawlyngbna. However, the respondents reported a decreasing occurrence of 
timber with properties suitable for construction in the community reserve forest 
and increasing difficulties to find firewood.
Actors (A)
The majority of Mawlyngbna’s 360 households rely on agroforestry as their main 
source of income and livelihoods. Most respondents cultivate in patches of private 
forest. Forest work is mostly executed by using traditional, labour-intensive 
technologies. More recently, motorised transportation facilitated extraction. 
Remarkable social capital and strong norms exist in Mawlyngbna as evidenced 
by active and frequent participation of respondents in several community 
organisations and religious rituals as well as by a strong bond between the families, 
clans, and village council. The clan and village heads are customarily described as 
a care taker of all families of their clan and village. The forest related norms of the 
villagers are rooted in the wisdom of their forefathers. For example, respondents 
traced their motivation for preservation to an inherited obligation from their 
forefathers’ initial dedication for its protection. Actors from the district and state 
Figure 4: Land use map of Mawlyngbna. 
Source: LaHaela 2013.
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level of India’s political system influence Mawlyngbna’s forest governance only 
sparsely and indirectly to date.
Governance system (GS)
Forest governance in Mawlyngbna is mostly handled by village-level entities. The 
village council is the legislative body for major collective choices. It consists of all 
male, long-standing residents over 18 years. The 18-person executive committee 
is the executive body of the village and decides in 3–4 meetings per month upon 
operational issues. The village headman bears major responsibilities for conflict 
resolution and sanctioning. He employs a graduated system of warnings and fines 
depending on the severity and frequency of infractions. He is supported by a forest 
assistant and secretary. All the functionaries of the village are appointed by the 
village council. The positions are volunteer positions but the village headman is 
offered a monetary gift at the end of his term. As for the property rights system, 
only the regional Syiem bears the exclusive right to alienate the land including the 
forests, agricultural, and open grass-land within the village boundaries. However, the 
village council can create their own institutional arrangements for Mawlyngbna and 
consultation with the Syiem is only required when it comes to change in land use. The 
villagers distinguish between the community reserve forest (CRF) and private forests 
(PF) as the two types of forest property rights systems in Mawlyngbna. They include 
extensive sets of operational-choice, collective-choice, and constitutional-choice 
rules regulating central issues such as access, use, taxation, sanctions, monitoring, 
resource protection, responsibilities and meeting procedures of governance bodies. 
These detailed rule sets are documented in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Interactions (I)
Mawlyngbna’s villagers harvest a variety of forest products both in the CRF and 
private forests (see ‘resource units’). The number of trees harvested in the CRF 
per year depends on the number of approved applications by families that decide 
to construct new houses. In private forests tree harvesting is largely unregulated 
and depends on the extent of wood use and crop cultivation. The introduction of 
stone quarrying and broom grass cultivation for revenue purposes increased the 
intensity of private forest use. Mawlyngbna’s forest governance system is almost 
entirely self-organised. Information such as about institutional arrangements or the 
state of the forest resources is shared effectively through personal interaction and 
at community meetings. Conflicts among users are infrequent. Respondents often 
did not even remember when they experienced the last dispute. Illegal cutting of 
living trees for firewood purposes constitutes the most frequent type of infraction. 
Resolution of conflicts is executed by the village headman, executive committee 
and village council. The villagers are responsible for monitoring each other’s 
forest use and the forest condition without a specifically appointed custodian. 
Forest resources in the CRF are renewed only through natural regeneration. In the 
private forest patches, crop trees are planted with seedlings from the CRF or from 
nurseries. For fire protection, a fund was implemented by the village council to 
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pay villagers who contribute to the fire suppression measures threatening the CRF. 
As detailed in Section 4.4 interactions with other governance levels are limited.
Outcomes (O)
With regard to ecological outcomes, the CRF and private forests significantly 
differ in basal area and average tree height, whereas stem density per 
hectare are very similar. As depicted in Table 2, many diversity indices were 
higher in the CRF (LaHaela 2013). There is an upward trend in total CRF 
area. However, the respondents reported increasing difficulties in finding 
appropriate construction timber and firewood in the CRF. Therefore, users 
of private forests stated that the opportunity to collect firewood in their own 
patches is of major importance.
With regard to social performance, the number of inhabitants without any 
access to a private forest patch was reported to be very small but accumulation 
of both land tenure and livelihood benefits is unequally distributed amongst the 
villagers of Mawlyngbna. As a respondent put it, “there are many more poor 
people than rich ones”. The respondents reported that income, education, clothing, 
and housing quality of a household are closely related to the amount and size 
of private forest patches under its control. Cultivable land and thus agricultural 
income opportunities can only be appropriated through inheritance or by monetary 
compensation for the growing crops in the rare occasions when a private forest 
patch is offered for alienation.
4.2. Explaining ecological outcomes
This section analyses the ecological outcomes of forest governance in 
Mawlyngbna. Forest users in Mawlyngbna have been able to avoid extraordinary 
forest degradation. However, lower values for tree height and basal area in 
combination with increased signs of disturbance (e.g. cutting and grazing) in a 
comparable environmental context (e.g. similar slope, exposition, soil properties) 
imply higher rates of resource extractions in the private forest patches. As a result, 
private forests contain less quality construction timber (tall, large-diameter trees 
of certain species), less genetic resources, as well as lower effects of production 
diversification and risk reduction (LaHaela 2013). In the following, we suggest an 
explanation for this pattern of ecological outcomes.
The incentives that resource users face depend directly on knowledge, values 
and the outcomes a user potentially has to face as a result of his or her actions. 
The villagers shared sound knowledge of the local institutional arrangements and 
forest boundaries. Frequent personal interaction and the mandatory presence at 
the village council meetings might contribute to effective information sharing 
amongst the village council members whereas non-members, in particular women 
and minors, are informed in less formal ways (e.g. conversations at home).
The combination of strong norms and social control (i.e. villagers notice 
other villagers’ actions while in the forest) make infractions in Mawlyngbna’s 
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forests potentially costly both monetarily and in terms of reputation in the village. 
Mawlyngbna’s rules put the responsibility on every villager to monitor the other 
users and to report infractions to the headman. This responsibility might be 
supported by the level of trust in the efficiency of the monitoring and sanctioning 
setup. At the same time, forest resources are of great importance for the villagers’ 
livelihoods and resource extraction can substantially increase their income. 
Therefore, this cluster of reasons supports the model of a decision heuristics of 
resource users that favours actions in compliance with the well-known rules while 
allowing for the promotion of resource extraction when and where it is permitted.
The above analysis implies that the difference in the ecological status of the 
community reserve forest and the private forests is the result of the differences 
in harvesting restrictions in Mawlyngbna’s operational choice rules. Since 
harvesting actions in the CRF are substantially limited to certain forest resources 
(e.g. deadwood, fruits, approved amounts of construction timber) whereas users 
of private patches face hardly any restriction, the incentives infer higher extraction 
activities in the latter. This inference matches LaHaela’s (2013) findings of a higher 
Shannon diversity index and a lower disturbance index in the CRF compared to 
the private forests (see Table 2).
4.3. Explaining social (in)equity
This section analyses the equity implications of Mawlyngbna’s institutional system 
in terms of livelihood opportunities and wealth. It proposes four mechanisms that 
explain how Mawlyngbna’s institutions affect social equity.
Livelihood opportunities and wealth distribution
The distribution of wealth was found to be substantially channelled by the rights to 
access forests and to withdraw resource units. Access to, and withdrawal from, the 
community reserve forest are rights that are equally inherent to every inhabitant 
Table 2: Structural and compositional parameter values for the mature tree life stage layer in 
the Community-Reserve Forest (CRF) and Private Forests (PF) and their α significance.
Source: LaHaela 2013.
Parameter  CRF  PF  α Significance
Total basal area (m2 ha–1)  30.2  14.9  α=0.05
Average height (m)  7.9  4.5  α=0.007
Average density (stems ha–1)  1338  1344  α=1
Total stumps  179  154  n/a
Total basal area (m2 ha–1) of stumps  9.4  8.9  n/a
Disturbance index (%)  17.7  39.0  α=0.156
Genera richness  56  44  α=0.070
Number of families  37  31  α=0.026
Shannon-Wiener’s diversity index (H’)  2.60  2.22  α=0.028
Simpson’s dominance index (λ)  0.07  0.13  α=0.005
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of Mawlyngbna. For instance, all families of married inhabitants – irrespective of 
wealth status, household size or private forest patches under their control – are 
eligible to apply once per year at the village headman to fell up to 50 living trees 
in the CRF for repairing or constructing houses.
In contrast to the CRF, most rights to access and withdraw from private forest 
patches are exclusive to particular households and they can only be transferred 
through inheritance or alienation. Inheritance is regulated through the matrilineal 
system (cf. Section 2), whereas alienation of forest land is possible only in the 
very rare instances if patches are offered and if the compensation for the growing 
stock can be afforded. The reported increase in effort required for collecting forest 
products in the CRF increases the importance of access to private forests. 
An interesting institution implemented as an essential equity mechanism 
operates against the exclusivity of access and withdrawal rights in private 
forests. All residents are permitted to quarry stones in all private forests. Hence, 
substantial additional forest-related livelihood opportunities are created that do 
not depend on the amount of private forests in which the villager holds user rights. 
However, the ecological impact of the institution is severe since vegetation and 
soil is removed in the quarrying process.
Privatisation and commercialisation
A development in Mawlyngbna’s property rights system, which might be most 
accurately termed privatisation, had a major impact on equity in the village. Over 
time, increasing amounts of arable land (that was initially mostly forested) was 
claimed through cultivation or through other investments as private patches for 
which the institutional arrangements grant exclusive user rights to the claimant. 
Respondents stated that population increase was a major driving force in this 
development. A “three-year-rule” applied that regulated exclusive withdrawal 
rights to the villager who initially cultivated a parcel of land. This exclusive 
withdrawal right would be lost only 3 years after the villager would have 
abandoned the land. This rule has promoted long-term claims over land and has 
shaped the overall distribution of land among families.
As increasing areas of land were taken under exclusive cultivation, 
abandonment of such patches decreased and the “three-year-rule” lost its 
relevance. When all arable land was claimed a single family could only acquire 
land through transfer of rights. If not inherited, such very rare transfers include 
a compensation for the crops growing on the alienated sites implying monetary 
valuation (i.e. the commercialisation of arable land). 
Deprivatisation
In contrast to the mechanisms above, a total area of 7.4 ha of previously private 
forest was annexed to the CRF in recent years. The patches that are located along 
the eastern boundary of the CRF were previously used as cemeteries and as bay 
leaf cultivation fields. The prior users are still allowed to harvest their crop trees 
until these die off. However, no further cultivation is permitted.
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Through the deprivatisation mechanism, although only used rarely so far, prior 
exclusively used forests are made available to all villagers. The deprivatisation 
mechanism restores forest area as CPR which increases equality of livelihood 
opportunities.
Gender equity
Women and men are equally active in operational activities such as collecting 
firewood and non-timber forest products as well as monitoring activities. Also, 
they have equal rights in the seizure of rule offenders. However, similar to 
many other Indian villages (Agarwal 2009), political equity in Mawlyngbna is 
constrained by the traditional custom of male dominance in collective-choice 
processes. Although women participate indirectly through networking activities 
of the women’s organisation, final collective decisions are made by the male 
villagers. When asked about their limited influence on forest governance decisions, 
the female respondents expressed their acceptance of this traditional custom and 
reported influence through discussions with the male household members.
4.4. Cross-level interactions
Forest governance in Mawlyngbna is nested within the polycentric institutional 
system of Meghalaya. Polycentric institutions organise governance in multiple 
arenas of decision-making. Each arena provides its participants with a certain 
degree of autonomy on specific domains. To the extent that multiple arenas are 
linked through cross-level interactions, they function as a polycentric system 
(Ostrom et al. 1961). As noted, the community of Mawlyngbna has considerable 
autonomy on matters of governing the forests that surround its village. Nonetheless, 
the activities of several organisations from higher governance levels may imply a 
re-scaling of the de-facto institutional boundaries of forest governance (Andersson 
2013). There is little literature on such cross-level interactions in Meghalaya which 
is often limited to evaluations of the relatively few Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) co-management partnerships (Malhotra et al. 2004; Poffenberger et al. 
2007; Kumar 2008a,b). Hence, this section analyses opportunities and constraints 
of cross-level forest governance interactions between villagers of Mawlyngbna 
and actors of other governance levels.
As a village of exceptional social and natural features, Mawlyngbna has 
moved into the focus of various actors at the state and district level. The village 
became a model for local development efforts and government programs invested 
in its infrastructure such as irrigation and water facilities as well as solar lights. 
In terms of forest management in a narrow sense, almost no interactions were 
found between the village and organisations of other levels at present. However, 
several organisations from higher levels promote increased cross-level interplay. 
The Government of Meghalaya recognised the state’s vulnerability to climate 
change and launched the State Climate Change Action Plan (GoM 2013). The 
plan encompasses an extensive list of suggestions for climate change adaptation 
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measures in forestry. The state-level Forest and Environment Department 
endeavours to provide remote-sensing based inventory data in efforts of 
implementing a working scheme for systematic forest management. Moreover, 
the district-level Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) launched a 
process for forest registration and rule codification. To date, only a few consultation 
meetings with the KHADC and a regional forest plan by the Syiem were found in 
Mawlyngbna and there appears to be minimal influence on the forest governance 
system by actors from other levels.
At the village-level, forest-related institutions from other levels were almost 
completely unknown and cross-level capacity building activities were not found. 
At the same time, the villagers’ statements show both hopes and reservations 
towards cross-level interactions. The villagers voiced strong concerns about 
potential encroachment on their autonomy and independence. Moreover, some 
interviewees would perceive increased cross-level interaction as incompatible 
with their community-based tradition: “Our forefathers did not want cooperation 
with the government”. Interviewees from higher levels mentioned constraints 
resulting from the abundant illiteracy among rural people which inhibits 
administrative processes. They also confirmed the suspicion of villagers that the 
motives of government authorities can be driven by their party’s political and 
power interests. In addition, possible corruption on the government side and the 
often disproportionate demands raised by communities undermine the sincerity 
in cross-level interplay. A structural constraint was mentioned in terms of the 
state government’s capacities. Cross-level interactions (e.g. law enforcement 
at the Indo-Bangladesh border to prevent timber smuggling, hearing of forest 
related cases at the courts, or constitution of new JFM committees) are limited by 
financial and staffing constraints.
Respondents also identified potential benefits from increased forest related 
cross-level interactions. Capacities to deal with large-scale hazards such as 
diseases and climate change impacts could be built with help from professional 
organisations of other levels. Furthermore, investments such as infrastructure 
facilities often exceed the financial capacities of communities which would 
require cross-level funding. Table 3 summarises the opportunities and constraints 
of cross-level interactions as stated by the respondents. Villagers showed interest 
in the potential benefits of cross-level interactions. However, they would continue 
to refuse such interactions unless agreements with the uncorrupted intention of 
mutual benefits are found with trustworthy partners.
5. Discussion
5.1. Ostrom’s design principles and the multiple dimensions of 
sustainability
The SES framework has been introduced as a heuristic tool to study the 
“sustainability of social-ecological systems” (Ostrom 2009). In a complementary 
way, Ostrom’s (1990, 2010) design principles for community-based natural 
Institutions for sustainable forest governance 687
resource governance continue to provide a parsimonious but powerful explanation 
how and why small-scale resource systems can survive productively over long time 
periods (Cox et al. 2010). In terms of the SES framework, the design principles 
provide a theory that traces the outcome parameter ‘robustness of a SES’ to eight 
specific features of the social-ecological system. 
Robustness, however, constitutes only one of multiple dimensions of 
sustainability. In particular, robustness does not guarantee per se an equitable 
distribution of the livelihood benefits provided by a resource system (Agrawal and 
Benson 2011). The Mawlyngbna case study exemplifies this. On the one hand, the 
village governed its surrounding forests productively for generations and Ostrom’s 
design principles are well fulfilled in Mawlyngbna, as Table 4 summarises. On 
the other hand, livelihood benefits of forests are inequitably distributed among 
the villagers (cf. Section 4.3). Hence, social-ecological systems that do fulfil the 
design principles do not necessarily imply equitable distributions.
To explain this puzzle, we argue that the design principles should be seen 
as a theory with the purpose to analyse robustness of, rather than equity in, 
social-ecological systems. Historically, the development of the design principles 
is rooted in a critique of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). This 
metaphor characterises ubiquitous free-rider problems as threats to the robustness 
of natural resource systems (Ostrom 1990). As a major response to the tragedy 
of the commons, the design principles reveal conditions that characterise long-
living resource systems in which resource users alleviated or prevented free-rider 
problems.
However, because the design principles focus on robustness of resource 
systems, they are not sufficiently tailored to explain the distributional patterns 
of resource benefits. For Mawlyngbna we find that rules which regulate user 
boundaries (design principle 1A) as well as appropriation and provision (design 
principle 2B) have major distributional implications (cf. Section 4.3). First, 
Table 3: Opportunities and constraints of increased cross-level interactions.
Possible partner  Opportunities  Constraints
Forest and Environment Department  High funding capacities  Low level of trust
 High professional capacities  Legal preconditions
 Legal timber sale through 
‘forest working plan’
 Potential dependence and 
autonomy constraints
  Party politics-driven
Khasi Hills Autonomous District 
Council
 High level of trust  Low funding capacities
 Contacts to FED  Party politics-driven
  Limited political influence
NGOs (e.g. Bethany Society, FES, 
Community Forestry International, 
IFAD)
 Politically independent  Low political influence
 Potentially high level of trust  
 High professional capacities  
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Table 4: The design principles of Ostrom (1990, 2010) for robust resource governance and 
assessment for Mawlyngbna’s forest governance.
Design principle  Description (cited from Ostrom 2010, 13)  Fulfilled in Mawlyngbna?
1a User boundaries  Clear and locally understood boundaries 
between legitimate users and nonusers are 
present.
 Yes.
1b Resource 
boundaries
 Clear boundaries that separate a specific 
common-pool resource from a larger 
social-ecological system are present.
 Yes.
2a Congruence with 
local conditions
Appropriation and provision rules 
are congruent with local social and 
environmental conditions.
 Partially. The allowance to cut 
live trees in the CRF is not 
dependent on the ecological state 
of the forest resources.
2b Appropriation 
and provision
 Appropriation rules are congruent with 
provision rules; the distribution of costs is 
proportional to the distribution of benefits.
 Yes.
3 Collective-choice 
arrangements
 Most individuals affected by a resource 
regime are authorized to participate in 
making and modifying its rules.
 Partially. Only male adults can 
participate.
4a Monitoring users Individuals who are accountable to or are 
the users monitor the appropriation and 
provision levels of the users.
 Partially. Only social control, no 
employed guards.
4b Monitoring the 
resource
 Individuals who are accountable to or 
are the users monitor the condition of the 
resource.
 Partially. Only anecdotal 
observations and traditional 
knowledge, no employed guards.
5 Graduated 
sanctions
 Sanctions for rule violations start very 
low but become stronger if a user 
repeatedly violates a rule.
 Yes.
6 Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms
 Rapid, low cost, local arenas exist for 
resolving conflicts among users or with 
officials.
 Yes.
7 Minimal 
recognition of 
rights to organise
 The rights of local users to make 
their own rules are recognized by the 
government.
 Yes.
8 Nested enterprises When a common-pool resource is closely 
connected to a larger social-ecological 
system, governance activities are 
organised in multiple nested layers.
 Currently few cross-level 
interdependencies  
(see Section 4.4).
principle 1A specifies that the rule system draws “clear and locally understood 
boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers” (Ostrom 2010, 13). In 
Mawlyngbna, user boundaries are clear and locally understood. But as soon as 
access and withdrawal rights are inequitably distributed among the resource users, 
clear boundaries imply inequalities in terms of resource benefits. This is the case 
for benefits from the clearly demarcated private forests in Mawlyngbna. Second, 
principle 2B refers to a situation in which “appropriation rules are congruent with 
provision rules; [and] the distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution 
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of benefits” (Ostrom 2010, 13). This congruence is well given in Mawlyngbna. 
At the same time, the ability to invest in cultivation, i.e. the ability to incur costs, 
is inequitably distributed among community members due to specific access 
rights for private forest patches. In such a situation of exclusive access rights, the 
congruence principle actually implies inequalities in terms of withdrawal rights 
and, consequently, resource benefits.
Taken together, the design principles specify conditions under which 
communities of resource users are likely to avoid free-rider incentives that might 
have devastating effects on a natural resource system. Hence, the design principles 
are a major theory to explain the robustness of resource systems. However, if 
the analytical purposes include not only robustness but also the explanation 
of the social equity dimension of sustainability, the design principles need to 
be extended by focusing on the distribution of access and withdrawal rights in 
resource systems.
5.2. Scale and polycentricity in the governance of natural resources
The Mawlyngbna case study contributes to scholarship about scale and 
polycentricity in the governance of natural resources. In particular, we discuss 
our findings with a view to Andersson and Ostrom’s (2008, 73) suggestion for 
scholars of polycentricity to examine “the extent to which back-up institutions [...] 
at higher or lower levels of governance [may] offset some of the imperfections of 
institutions at any one level”. Scale refers here to the spatial, jurisdictional, and 
temporal dimensions of a governance system that is used to govern a resource 
system (Gibson et al. 2000; Berkes 2002; Cash et al. 2006). Scaling implies a 
particular distribution of control over a resource system (Robbins 1998). It shapes 
whose knowledge and values are brought into governance processes, to whose 
benefits and costs (Vatn 2005), and how social-ecological interdependences 
within and across scales are accommodated in a governance system (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006; Paavola 2007). 
Questions of scale in governing forests and land have been highly contentious 
in North-East India for generations (Karlsson 2011). Tribal communities in the 
region have a long and ongoing history of engaging both peacefully and violently 
for the continued recognition of their self-governing autonomy by state and national 
governments (Karlsson 2006). Over time, several community-based governance 
systems in North-East India encountered high degrees of deforestation. They were 
used as a central argument for intervention by the Indian Supreme Court’s logging 
ban in the mid-1990s and to establish state-community co-management schemes 
(Karlsson 2006; Poffenberger et al. 2007; Kumar 2008b). Hence, can back-up 
institutions at higher levels of governance offset some of the imperfections of 
community-based institutions? 
In the Mawlyngbna case-study, we identified trust across levels as a critical 
factor for the extent to which a polycentric organisation of forest governance 
with increased community-state-interactions would be likely to improve social-
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ecological outcomes (cf. Section 4.4). The community-based governance of local 
forests for generations has formed an intimate relationship of tribal communities 
in all of Meghalaya with their forests (Karlsson 2011). Decades of self-governing 
their forests have formed deep local ecological knowledge, livelihood dependency, 
place-based identities, belonging, and self-understanding of Meghalayan tribal 
communities (Karlsson 2011) – an instance of Agrawal’s (2005) notion of 
environmentality. With regard to forest property rights, tribal communities of 
Meghalaya have developed a deep sense of ownership for their surrounding 
forests. The actual forest users perceive the legitimate forest property rights to 
lie with tribal communities rather than with the state. Hence, activities at higher 
governance levels that may involve a shift of property rights face serious concerns 
over the potential encroachment of autonomy of tribal communities. Such mistrust 
is rooted in memories of historical experiences such as the Supreme Court’s 
timber ban decisions in 1996 and 1998. It was perceived that state authorities 
would disrespect the autonomy of tribal communities as formally granted in the 
Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution (Nongbri 2001; Karlsson 2006). 
In such an environment of deeply rooted forest-bound community identities 
and cross-level mistrust, a partial relocation of formal property rights from 
communities to the state, e.g. in co-management schemes, faces the serious 
risk to be considered illegitimate by the actual forest users. Without legitimacy, 
however, the transaction costs of forest governance are likely to be substantial 
because unaccepted constraints on forest use need tight external monitoring 
and enforcement. This meets constrained financial and staff capacities of state 
organisations to perform critical governance functions in distant areas. As a 
consequence, a partial relocation of management rights from forest users to state 
actors may erode traditional institutions that were crafted and accepted by forest 
users (Tiwari et al. 2013). Hence, ecological destruction from resource overuse 
would continue and possibly even increase if the surrogate polycentric institutions 
are not more effective in organising the critical governance functions of excluding 
non-authorised users, regulating resource use, cost recovery, monitoring, conflict 
resolution, and enforcement of rules (Paavola 2007). 
In summary, even though any governance system has imperfections (Andersson 
and Ostrom 2008), it seems unlikely that the creation of “back-up institutions” 
at higher levels of governance improves social-ecological outcomes if the focal 
SES is characterised by deep mistrust across governance levels combined with 
resource-bound identities of forest users. 
Interestingly, Robbins (1998) and Robbins et al. (2007) found for Rajasthan 
that the location of authority over natural resources between state or local levels 
is less fundamental for ecological outcomes than the breadth and legitimacy of 
authority. The Mawlyngbna case-study complements this finding by showing that 
the location, breadth, and legitimacy of authority are deeply intertwined as soon 
as forest users hold particular views of the acceptable location of the bundle of 
forest property rights.
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5.3. Experiences with the SES framework
As expected in social-ecological systems, data collection and analysis was 
characterised by substantial diversity and complexity of variables and relations 
(Ostrom 2009). In this case study, the SES framework fulfilled its purpose of 
promoting a diagnostic approach to SES analysis. It proved to be a strong tool 
for both structuring the diversity of data and making findings comparable to other 
studies in often disparate contexts through a common vocabulary (McGinnis 
and Ostrom 2014). Furthermore, it provided heuristic devices to elaborate 
explanations of the observed ecological and social performance of Mawlyngbna’s 
forest governance. 
In the course of our deductive-inductive analysis, some modifications of the 
SES framework were required. First, the provided set of variables was partly 
insufficient for us to provide a detailed analysis of central natural resource issues 
such as equity and cross-level interactions. As Table 1 illustrates, additional 
variables were introduced for specific outcomes (e.g. O1.1. “equity”, O4 
“outcomes of cross-level interactions”). Second, some original SES variables 
were not addressed in detail because of their minor relevance for the research 
questions (e.g. RU6 “distinctive characteristics”, ECO2 “pollution patterns”, O3 
“externalities to other SESs”). Third, the organisation variables were modified. 
The SES framework’s original distinction between government and non-
government organisations did not match well with the structure of organisations 
in Meghalaya’s governance system. We found a classification of organisations 
according to governance levels (variables GS1.1-GS1.6) more insightful. 
Most importantly, it proved difficult to use the SES framework to map the 
interactions between the various governance levels (village, regional, district, 
state, national) that are conceptually distinct to the interactions within each of 
these levels. As noted in Section 4.4, the activities of several organisations from 
higher governance levels may invoke a re-scaling of forest governance implying 
that the bundle of property rights is altered across governance levels. For this 
case-specific reason and because polycentricity has been identified as a critical 
feature in resource governance more generally, we propose the SES framework 
should be able to map cross-level interactions between adjacent governance arenas 
explicitly. To make this explicit we distinguished the “interaction” variables (I) 
into same-level interactions (codes I1 and I1.1–I1.11 in Table 1) and cross-level 
interactions (codes I2 and I2.1–I2.11). 
Finally, the SES framework is an extension of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2011). The integration of concepts from 
the IAD framework such as the action situation and its working parts added to the 
analytical power of the present institutional analysis. However, clear theoretical 
guidance on how to do this systematically is still missing. Hence, further 
theoretical research is required at the interfaces of both frameworks. For instance, 
which SES second-tier variables are related to the particular working parts of the 
action situation and how are these relations characterised?
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6. Conclusion
Mawlyngbna in Meghalaya, India, constitutes a case of remarkably strong 
traditional institutions in the setting of a state in which communities enjoy major 
autonomy for their natural resource governance. This study adopted the SES 
framework (Ostrom 2009) to explain the ecological outcomes and social equity 
patterns of forest governance in Mawlyngbna. Several lessons may be drawn from 
this analysis.
First, the study confirms the diagnostic power of Ostrom’s design principles 
(1990, 2010) to explain the ecological status in community reserve forests and 
private forests in Mawlyngbna (Section 4.2). However, the design principles 
were less informative in explaining the observed patterns of social equity. To be 
precise, the design principles should be seen as theoretical propositions to explain 
the robustness of forest governance. However, Section 5.1 identified several 
blind spots of the design principles in the explanation of social equity in resource 
governance. 
Second, the SES framework provided the research team with a powerful heuristic 
tool to gain a detailed understanding of forest governance in Mawlyngbna. At the 
same time, the framework provides a language that makes findings comparable to 
studies in other contexts. We seek to advance the analytical usefulness of the SES 
framework by combining it with the IAD-concepts of action situations and its 
behavioural rational choice approach to explain ecological outcomes and social 
equity of community forestry in Mawlyngbna.
As a final note, it was challenging to conceptualise interactions across governance 
levels with the SES framework. Hence, for purposes of analysing interactions across 
governance levels in polycentric systems we suggest a conceptual modification. 
This could be done by distinguishing the “interaction” category into “same-level 
interactions” and “cross-level interactions” (Section 5.3). 
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Appendix
Table A1
General Rules
1. The Executive Committee of the MawsynramSyiemship grants access to 
use the land of Mawlyngbna.
2. Burning is prohibited on the land of Mawlyngbna.
Community Reserve Forest
1. Only residents of Mawlyngbna are allowed to use the CRF.
2. The following products are allowed to be extracted from the CRF without 
special permission: firewood, plant parts (including medicinal plants) but 
not the whole plant, and bay leaf tree seedlings (Cinnamomumtamala).
3. Firewood can only be collected for self use and to sell it in the Mawlyngbna 
market.
4. Collecting wild flowers is prohibited in the CRF.
5. Hunting of any kind of animal is prohibited in the CRF.
6. Stone mining is prohibited in the CRF.
7. Cattle grazing is permitted in the CRF.
8. Living trees of the CRF can only be cut for personal construction purposes 
and only after the approval of a written application by the Village Headman.
9. A service charge of Indian Rupees (INR) 50 applies per application to cut 
living trees of the CRF.
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10. Cutting live trees can be only granted to married villagers and to families 
which have to arrange a funeral.
11. For the construction of wooden houses, an unlimited number of trees can 
be granted to be cut per person per year.
12. For the construction of cement houses a maximum number of 50 living 
trees can be granted to be cut per person per year.
13. In case of an emergency, the Village Council can decide to cut and sell live 
trees from the CRF in order to receive extra funds.
14. Only residents of Mawlyngbna are allowed to carry out the works such as 
tree cutting in the CRF.
15. CRF resources can only be sold at the market in Mawlyngbna.
16. In case of a fire threatening the CRF, each resident is obliged to help fight 
the fire.
Private forests
1. Non-CRF land within the area dedicated to the Mawlyngbna residents can 
be claimed as private forest (PF).
2. If a piece of PF is not cultivated (i.e., no crops such as bay leaf trees or 
betel nut trees are growing on it) for at least three consecutive years it is 
open to be claimed by another Mawlyngbna villager.
3. The right of use of a PF patch can only be transferred amongst Mawlyngbna 
residents.
4. Except for burning, any form of use by the user is permitted in the PF.
5. The Village Council can levy a tax on sold cash crops extracted from PFs.
6. PF users can be expropriated of a certain PF patch if the Village Headman 
approves the application of another villager for constructing a house there.
7. Cash crop trees have to be compensated (INR 50 per tree).
8. The Village Council can decide to expropriate PF patches for development 
projects.
9. The Village Council can decide to expropriate PF patches and convert 
them into CRF.
10. The former user of converted PF is only allowed to harvest remaining 
crops (e.g., bay leaves or areca nuts) as long as the crop plants live but may 
not undertake any maintenance.
11. Any villager is allowed to quarry stone in any PF no matter if the villager 
is the “owner” or not.
12. The elimination of vegetation in PF for stone quarrying is permitted except 
for the crop trees and only after consultation with the “owner”.
